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The Submerged Constitutional Right to an Absentee Ballot 
In an attempt to accommodate the growing number of people1 
who cannot be present at the polls on election day, many states and 
1. The passage of the twenty-sixth amendment, which lowered the voting age in 
all elections to 18, enfranchised many students, who might be expected to apply for 
absentee ballots if they are attending schools away from their residences. New York 
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the federal government have enacted statutes that allow voters to cast 
their ballots in advance of the election either by mail or in person. 
Eligibility for these absentee ballots is, however, restricted to those 
voters who fall within the classifications set up by the statute, and 
occasionally the option is open only to those who wish to vote in 
general elections. The few court decisions that have reviewed state 
absentee-ballot legislation, or the lack of such legislation, have not 
shed much light on the constitutional validity of present eligibility 
schemes.2 
In almost all states, the eligibility requirements in absentee-vot-
ing legislation are not all-inclusive, but leave certain classes of voters 
who are both unable to be at the polls and not permitted to cast 
absentee ballots. It has been estimated that three million qualified 
voters were unable to vote in the I 968 presidential election because 
they were ineligible to receive absentee ballots under local law.3 
Congress did not wait for prodding from the courts to remedy this 
serious situation, at least with regard to federal elections. In an effort 
to ensure that all qualified voters, regardless of where they might be 
on election day, have the opportunity to vote for President and Vice-
President, Congress enacted federal absentee-voting legislation, along 
with other voting reform measures, in the Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1970.4 Congress found that "the lack of sufficient opportuni-
ties for ... absentee balloting in presidential elections ... denies or 
abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to vote ... [and] 
to enjoy their free movement across State lines" and that state legisla-
tion restricting the availability of absentee ballots "does not bear a 
reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the con-
duct of presidential elections."5 The amendments order the states to 
City officials cited student ,·oters as a reason for the increase in the number of absentee 
ballots from almost 29,500 in 1968 to over 48,800 in 1972. N.Y. Times, No,•. 7, 1972, at 
24, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
2. Compare McDonald v. Board uf Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969) and Fidell 
v. Board of Elections, 343 F. Supp. 913 (E.D.N.Y.), affd., 409 U.S. 972 (1972) with Goosby 
v. Osser, 452 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1971), revd., 409 U.S. 512 (1973) and O'Brien v. Skinner, 409 
U.S. 1240 (1972) (Marshall, Cir. J.). • 
3. Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507, and Title IV of S. 2029 Before the Subcomm. 
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., ]st &: 2d 
Sess. 281 (1969-70). 
4. Act of June 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified in 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973b, 1973c, 1973aa to 1973bb-4 (1970)). Section 6 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1970), 
prohibits, until 1975, the use of literacy tests in determining voting qualifications in any 
local, state, or federal election in any state or political subdivision to which similar re-
strictions in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970), do not already 
apply. Section 6 also abolishes state durational residency requirements for voting for 
President and Vice-President, establishes the uniform absentee-ballot provisions de-
scribed in the text, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (1970), and, as modified by the decision in 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), reduces the voting age in federal elections to 
eighteen. 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb to bb-2 (1970). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(a) (1970). 
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provide absentee ballots in presidential elections to any otherwise 
qualified resident who expects to be absent from his district on elec-
tion day and has applied for a ballot at least seven days before the 
election.0 
In nonpresidential elections voters must still meet the require-
ments of the varied, 7 and generally less inclusive, state provisions. 8 
Maine has the most sweeping statute; it provides that any registered 
voter may cast an absentee ballot.9 Presumably, those who are able to 
vote in person do so, but the statute does not require applicants for 
absentee ballots to demonstrate an inability to reach the polls. In all 
other states, voters who wish to cast an absentee ballot must demon-
strate that they fall within a statutory classification. 
Although most states provide absentee ballots in all elections, 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(d) (1970). If an otherwise qualified voter is not eligible to 
vote in his district because he has taken up residence there within thirty days before 
the particular election and therefore does not satisfy local registration requirements, that 
voter must be allowed to vote in person or to cast an absentee ballot in the district in 
which he resided immediately before he moved to the new location. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-
l(e) (1970). 
7. Occasionally a statute is tailored to meet the unique needs of the electorate. 
For example, in Alaska, where extreme weather conditions can reasonably be anticipated, 
the expected inaccessibility of the polls is an authorized reason for obtaining an ab-
sentee ballot. ALAsKA STAT. § 15.20.010(3) (1962). In the Gulf Coast state of Mississippi 
workers on off-shore oil rigs and commercial fishing boats may obtain absentee ballots. 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 3203-302(3) (Supp. 1972). 
8. The state statutes defining groups of voters eligible for absentee ballots are: 
A.LA. CODE tit. 17, § 64(16) (Supp. 1972); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 15.20.010-.015 (1962); Aruz. 
REv. SrAT. ANN. § 16-II0l (Supp. 1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-903 (Supp. 1971); CAL.'ELEC· 
TIONS CODE § 14620 (West 1961); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-14-1 (1964), 49-25-2 (Supp. 
1965); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-134, -135 (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5503 
(Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ANN.§ l-II09(b) (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.021(6) (Supp. 
1972); GA. CODE ANN. 34-1401 (Supp. 1972); HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. §§ 15-1, -12 (Supp. 1971); 
IDAHO CODE§ 34-1001-1 to -3 (Supp. 1972); !LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 19-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-4901 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 53.l (1973); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 25-lll9, -1229 (Supp. 1972); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 125.220, .230 (Supp. 1972); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1071 (1969); :ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1251-62 (1964); MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 27-1 to -2 (Supp. 1972); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 54, § 86 (Supp. 1972); 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§§ 168.758-.759a (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 207.02 (Supp. 
1973); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 3203-202, -302 (Supp. 1972): Mo. ANN. STAT. § II2.0IO (Supp. 
1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 23-3701 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 32-802 (1968), 
-803 (Supp. 1972); NEV. REv. STAT. § 293.313 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 60:1, :17 
(1970), :26 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:57-3 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-6-3 
(1970); N.Y. ELEcrIONS LAw §§ 117, II7-a (McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney 
Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-226 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16-18-01 
(1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3509.02 (Page 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 326, 343 
(Supp. 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. § 253.010 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3146.l (Supp. 
1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 17-20-1 (1969); S.C. CODE OF LAws §§ 23-442, -449.31 (Supp. 
1971); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 12-19-1 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-602 (Supp. 
1972); TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 5.05, subdivs. 1, 2a (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-
6-1 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 121(1) (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-227 (1973); 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29.36.010 (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-1 (1971); WIS. 
STAT. ANN.§ 6.85 (Supp. 1973); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 22.1-135 (Supp. 1973). 
9. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1251-62 (1964). 
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four restrict their use to general elections.10 In many states, eligibility 
is determined by the voter's actual distance from his home. The 
majority of states require absence from the county of the voter's 
residence;11 others require absence from the state,12 the city,18 or the 
precinct.14 Some absentee-ballot legislation encompasses classes of 
voters who are within the election district but cannot reach the polls, 
Almost all states allow the physically incapacitated to cast absentee 
ballots.15 Some also furnish absentee ballots to students,16 to election 
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5503 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. ELECTIONS LAW §§ 117, 117-a 
(McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-226 
(1972); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 17-20-1 (1969). 
11. ALA.. CODE tit. 17, § 64(16)(b) (Supp. 1972); COLO, R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 49-14-1 (1964); 
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 15, § 5503 (Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1109(b) (Supp. 1972); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.021(6)(e) (Supp. 1972); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 15-1 (Supp. 1971) (ab-
sence from district, county, or island); !LI.. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 19-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp, 
1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-4901 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 53.1(1) (1973); KAN. STAT, 
ANN. § 25-1119 (Supp. 1972); KY. REV. STAT. § 125.230(1) (Supp. 1972); LA. R.Ev. STAT, ANN. 
§ 18.1071 (1969) (absence from parish); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 27-l(a) (Supp. 1972); Miss. 
CODE ANN. § 3203-302 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 112.010 (Supp. 1973); MONT. REV. 
CODES ANN. § 23-3701 (Supp. 1973); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 32-803 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 
1972); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 3-6-3 (1970); N.Y. ELECTIONS LAW§ 117(1) (McKinney 1964) (!£resi-
dent of New York City, then absent from that city); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163·226 (1972); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16-18-01 (1971); OHIO REv. CODE ANN, § 3509.02 (Page 1972); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 326 (Supp. 1972): ORE. REV. STAT. § 253.0lO(l)(a) (1971); PA. 
STAT. ANN.§ 3146.l(j) (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-602 (Supp. 1972); TEX. El.EC• 
TION CODE art. 5.05, subdiv. 1 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-6-1 (Supp. 1973); VA, 
CODE ANN. § 24.1-227(1) (absence from city also); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-1(3) (1971): 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22.1-135 (Supp. 1973) (absence from "place of residence'?• 
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-135 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:57-8 (Supp. 
1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 17-20-1 (1969). 
13. CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 49-25-2 (Supp. 1965); MAss. ANN, LAws ch. 54, § 86 (Supp. 
1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 16B.75B(l)(e) (Supp. 1973); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 60:l 
(1970), :26 (Supp. 1972) (N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 60:17 (1970) requires the spouse of an 
armed serviceman to be absent from the city, but applies no such requirement to the scr• 
viceman); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-227(1) (1973) (absence from county also); Wis. STAT. 
ANN. § 22.1-135 (Supp. 1973). 
14. ALAsKA STAT. § 15.20.010(1) (1962); AIUz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-llOlA (Supp. 1972): 
CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 14620 (West 1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1401 (Supp. 1972) (clcc• 
tion district); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 207.02 (Supp. 1973): NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 293.313(l)(a) 
(1971); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-1 (Supp. 1973); WASH. R.Ev. CoDE ANN. § 29,36.010 
(1) (Supp. 1972). 
15. ALAsKA STAT. § 15.20.010(2) (1962); AIUz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-llOlA (Supp. 1972): 
.ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-903(b) (Supp. 1971); CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 14620 (West 1961): 
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-14-1 (1964), 49-25-2 (Supp. 1965); CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN, 
§ 9-135 (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5503(b) (Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ANN, 
§ l-1109(b) (Supp. 1972): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.021(6){a) (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN, 
§ 34-1401 (Supp. 1972); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 15-12(2) (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE § 34. 
1002A(4) (Supp. 1973); !LI.. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 19-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); IND, ANN, 
STAT. § 29-4901 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 53.1(2) (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1229 
(Supp. 1972); KY. REv. STAT. § 125.220 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 27-2(a) 
(Supp. 1972): MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 86 (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 168.758(l)(a) (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 207.02 (Supp. 1973); Miss. CODE ANN, 
§ 3203-302(4) (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 112.010 (Supp. 197ll); MONT. REV. CODES 
ANN. § 23-3701 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-802 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.313 
(l)(b) (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 60:1 (1970), :26 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19:57-3 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-6-3 (1970); N.Y. ELECTIONS LAW § 117-a 
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workers stationed at precincts other than their own,17 to persons 
over sixty-five years of age,18 and to persons whose religious beliefs 
prevent them from attending the polls on election day.19 ' 
Under all except the most liberal statutes, some qualified voter~ 
who are not able to reach the polls are not eligible for absentee 
ballots. For instance, parents with very young or sick children. may be 
unable to leave their homes to vote, yet a state that grants absentee 
ballots only to voters who are themselves ill would deny absentee 
ballots to the parents. Similarly, jurors and business people who are 
involved in all-day conferences or called out of town might be denied 
absentee ballots. 
Since legislative action or inaction has caused their inability to 
cast a ballot, these citizens might be expected to seek relief in the 
courts. There have been two constitutional challenges to absentee-
voting legislation. In the first, voters, otherwise eligible to vote in a 
general election, who did not meet state requirements for. obtaining 
absentee ballots objected to those requirements. In the second, vot-
ers otherwise eligible to vote in a primary election objected to a state 
statutory scheme that provides absentee ballots only in general elec-
tions. The Supreme Court rejected the first challenge essentially be-
cause the issue was not properly framed. The second challenge was 
(McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-
226(a)(2) (1972); N.D. CENT. CoDE ANN. § 16-18-01 (1971); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3509.02 
(Page 1972) (requires entry into hospital); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 326 (Supp. 1972); 
ORE. REv. STAT. § 253.0IO(l)(a) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3146.l(k) (Supp, 1973); 
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 17-20-1 (1969); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 12-19-l (Supp. 1973); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-602(c) (Supp. 1972); TEX. ELECTION CoDE art. 5.05, subdiv. 1 (Supp. 
1972); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 20-6-1 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 121(1} (1968); 
VA. CoDE ANN. § 24.1-227(4) (1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29.36.010(2) (Supp. 1972); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-1(1) (1971); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.85 (Supp. 1973); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 22.1-135 (Supp. 1973). . . 
16. ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 64(16)(a) (Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 9.135 (Supp. 
1973); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18.1071 (1969); MISS. CODE ANN. § 3203-302(1) (Supp. 1972); 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 19:57-3 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. ELECTIONS LAW§ 117(3)(c) (McKinney 1964); 
s.c. CODE OF LAws § 23-442(2)(e) (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-227(3) (1973). 
17. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.021(6)(b) (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1401 (Supp. 1972); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 19-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-4901 (Supp. 
1972); MICIJ. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.758(l)(c) (Supp. 1972); w. VA. CQDE ANN. § il-3-1 
(1971). 
18. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-ll0lA (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 168.758 
(l)(d) (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 17,20-1 (1969) ("old age" or "other physical 
infirmities''); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 22.1-135 (Supp. 1973) ("old age"). 
19. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-ll0lB (Supp. 1972); CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 14620 
(West 1961); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-14-1 (1964), 49-25-2 (Supp. 1965); FL,\. S;AT. 
ANN. § 97.021(6)(c) (Supp. 1972); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 15-12(2) (Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 46, § 19-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 168.758(l)(b) 
(Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 207.02 (Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 112.010 (Supp. 
1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 19:57-3 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 3-6-3 (1970); Omo. REv. 
CODE ANN. § 3509.02 (Page 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-602 (Supp. 1972); TEX. ELECTION 
CODE art. 5.05, subdiv. 1 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 12l(i) (1968); WASH. REv. 
CODE ANN. § 29.36.010(3) (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.85 (Supp. 1973); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 22.1-135 (Supp. 1973). 
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rejected by a three-judge lower court and affirmed without opinion 
by the Supreme Court. The murky status of the law arising out of 
this combination of a poorly presented case and a summary affirmance 
without opinion was further clouded by a subsequent Supreme Court 
opinion that suggested that a different result might have been reached 
in the first case had the issue been properly framed. 
The first case was McDonald v. Board of Election Commission-
ers.20 The appellants, a class of unsentenced inmates awaiting trial 
in the Cook County jail, could not vote in person at their precincts 
on the day of a primary election because they were detained in jail, 
charged with nonbailable offenses or unable to raise bail money. Al-
though they were all qualified voters in Cook County and had made 
timely application for absentee ballots, the Board of Election Com-
missioners had denied their requests on the ground that the Illinois 
Election Code did not provide for absentee ballots for members of 
their class. The applicable sections of the Code defined four groups 
who were entitled to absentee ballots: (1) those absent from the 
county of their residence on the day of the election for any reason, 
(2) those physically incapacitated, (3) those whose religious obser-
vances prevented them from attending the polls, and (4) those acting 
as poll watchers in precincts other than their own.21 In their attack 
on this statutory scheme the appellants presented two arguments 
based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
First, they contended that the second legislative classification de-
scribed above arbitrarily distinguished betw·een medically incapaci-
tated and "judicially" incapacitated voters. Second, they maintained 
that the statute was also arbitrary in that it denied them absentee 
ballots because they were Cook County residents confined in a Cook 
County jail, while it allowed absentee ballots to residents jailed out-
side Cook County as "voters absent from the county of their resi-
dence.'' 1 
The Court's disposition of lvf cDonald was largely dictated by its 
selection of a standard of review to test the validity of the state's clas-
sification under the equal protection clause. In previous cases dealing 
with voting the Court had used a strict standard of review;22 it had 
required that the classification be precisely tailored so as to accom-
plish the state's purpose and that the purpose be a compelling one.23 
20. 394 U.S. 802 (1969). 
21. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 19-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973). 
22. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. 
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965): Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
23. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). The only challenged voting 
requirements that have survived strict judicial scrutiny are the fifty-day durational rcsi• 
dency requirements in Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973), and Burns v. Fo1·tson, 410 
U.S. 686 (1973). See also Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 343•44, 347; Abate v. Mundt, 403 
U.S. 182, 185-87 (1970). 
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In McDonald the Court distinguished these earlier cases. First, it 
noted that the distinctions made by Illinois were not based on suspect 
classifications such as wealth or race. Second, the court could not find 
a clear showing that the McDonald appellants had in fact been dis-
enfranchised:24 "The record is barren of any indication that the State 
might not, for instance, possibly furnish the jails with special polling 
booths or facilities on election day, or provide guarded transporta-
tion to the polls themselves for certain inmates, or entertain motions 
for temporary reductions in bail to allow some inmates to get to the 
polls on their own."25 Rather, the Court pointed out, the case in-
volved a claimed right to absentee ballots and did not involve the 
right to vote. Because of the failure to demonstrate a denial of a 
fundamental right such as the right to vote, the Court applied the 
more traditional equal protection analysis: "The distinctions dra,vn 
by a challenged statute must bear some rational relationship to a · 
legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the 
pursuit of that goal."26 This rational relationship test is a much less 
stringent standard of review than the compelling interest test; in 
fact, under its guise the Court has often upheld classifications that 
appeared to be arbitrary on their face.27 
Applying the rational relationship standard to the appellant's 
first argument in McDonald, the Court found that the classification 
of medically incapacitated voters was reasonable, since such persons, 
in order to obtain absentee ballots, had been required to present 
affidavits from their doctors in order to demonstrate their absolute 
inability to reach the polls, whereas the pretrial detainees had not 
shmvn that they were "absolutely prohibited" from voting.28 The 
Court rejected the appellants' second argument on the ground that 
the difference in treatment between those detained in the county 
of their residence and those held elsewhere might have been moti-
vated by a legislative fear that officials would try to influence the 
votes of local inmates.29 
The Court emphasized the remedial nature of the Illinois absen-
tee-voting legislation. The state, it said, had simply made it easier 
for certain classes of people to vote; it had not denied the vote to 
anyone.80 The Court noted that Illinois had consistently expanded 
24. 394 U.S. at 807-08. 
25. 394 U.S. at 808 n.6. 
26. 394 U.S. at 809. 
27. E.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471 (1970); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesaert v. 
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
28. 394 U.S. at 809-10. 
29. 394 U.S. at 810. 
30. 394 U.S. at 809-10. 
164 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:157 
the number of groups included in the absentee-voting legislation and 
that the present scheme was more liberal than many of those in force 
in other states.31 The fact that Illinois did not go further and allow 
all possible classes of voters to cast absentee ballots "should not ren-
der void its remedial legislation, which need not . . . 'strike at all 
evils at the same time.' "32 
The McDonald appellants made a critical mistake in failing to 
request other means of voting besides absentee ballots. As a result, 
their argument that they had been denied the right to vote was not 
presented in the clearest possible terms. 
In Fidell v. Board of Elections,33 New York's election law, which 
makes provision for absentee ballots only in general elections,84 was 
challenged. The plaintiffs alleged that they would be unable to vote 
in person in a primary election, and thus avoided the error made in 
McDonald, but they too were unsuccessful in their attempt to obtain 
absentee ballots. One of the individual named plaintiffs was on active 
duty with the United States Coast Guard and would be stationed 
outside the state on the date of the June 1972 primary election. An-
other attended college outside New York. A third, an airline steward-
ess, would be out of the state on election day if her work schedule so 
required. A fourth was incapacitated and physically unable to travel 
to a polling place. They claimed that by requiring them to vote in 
person if they wished to vote in the primary election at all, the stat-
ute denied them the vote in violation of their right to equal pro-
tection of the law and their right to travel.35 
The Board of Elections contended that providing absentee bal-
lots in primary elections would be impractical and expensive, for 
last minute changes in the candidates frequently require election 
eve modifications in the ballots, and a different ballot is required 
for each of the state's 12,750 election districts.36 The court found 
that the state had demonstrated a rational basis for its action, re-
fused to use the strict, compelling interest standard of judicial re-
view, and stated summarily that "[t]he cases applying such stringent 
standards as a compelling state interest and striking down state prac-
tices have involved exclusion from the ballot of a class of voters on 
grounds far different from those presented in the present case.''37 
31. 394 U.S. at 810-11. 
32. 394 U.S. at 811, quoting Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 
U.S. 608, 610 (1935). 
33. 343 F. Supp. 913 (E.D.N.Y.), afjd., 409 U.S. 972 (1972). 
34. N.Y. Er.EcnoNs LAw § 117 (McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
New York is one of only four states with such a restriction. See note 19 supra. 
35. Plaintiffs also claimed that the state was required by the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970 to provide them with absentee ballots, but the lack of any pro• 
vision that so provided caused them to abandon that argument. 343 F. Supp. at 916. 
36. 343 F. Supp. at 915. 
37. 343 F. Supp. at 915. 
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Citing McDonald, the court focused on the remedial nature of pri-
maries, which, it noted, allowed for more citizen participation in 
candidate selection than did the procedures used in states that had 
no primary elections: 
While it is true as a general proposition that the right to vote in pri-
maries receives the same constitutional protection as the right to vote 
in general elections, . . . it is also true that many states nominate 
candidates, or choose delegates to national nominating conventions, 
by means of caucuses or conventions at which, if there is indeed any 
provision at all for general participation, party members are required 
to be physically present in order to record their choices .... It is our 
view that when the legislature decides to employ the primary, it is 
not constitutionally required to do more than avoid arbitrary or 
invidious classifications. 38 
The complaint was dismissed, and the Supreme Court affirmed with-
out opinion. 
The effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in McDonald and 
Fidell is unclear. McDonald can be explained by inadequate argu-
ment by counsel; Fidell applies only to primary elections. Moreover, 
while a summary affirmance, such as that made by the Supreme Court 
in Fidell, is technically a decision on the merits,39 the Court has 
indicated that such affirmances are not always to be given full prece-
dential value. For example, in Dunn v. Blumstein,40 the state of 
Tennessee argued that a challenge to its durational residence require-
ments for voting was foreclosed by a 1965 summary affirmance of a 
case that upheld similar requirements in Maryland.41 The Court 
brushed aside the earlier case, noting that it had been decided sum-
marily, without oral argument, and that it had subsequently become 
clear to the Court that "a more exacting test is required for any 
standard that 'place[s] a condition on the exercise of the right to 
vote.' "42 
Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court has not yet spoken 
definitively on the existence or nonexistence of a right to an absentee 
ballot. When the Supreme Court next considers the issue, the deci-
sion will turn on the standard of review used to test the classifications 
38. 343 F. Supp. at 916. 
39. E.g., Barton v. Sentner, 353 U.S. 963, 963 (1957) (Burton & Clark, JJ., dissenting). 
See R. STERN & E. GRESS!IIAN, SUl'REME COURT PRACOCE 197 (4th ed. 1969). 
40. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
41. 405 U.S. at 337, citing Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). 
42. 405 U.S. at 337, quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). The dis-
inclination to give summary affinnances full precedential weight may become more 
common as a result of the Court's swollen docket. Because of its large caseload, in recent 
years the Court has summarily upheld well over half the appeals that have come before 
it. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 39, at 194. See generally P. FREUND, THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 14-15 (1961); Currie, The Three-Judge District 
Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, '74 n.365 (1964). 
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established by a state.43 Although the compelling interest standard 
.is commonly used in voting cases, the Supreme Court has explained 
that not every limitation or incidental burden placed on the fran-
chise will trigger strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.44 
The lower court in Fidell found that the denial of the use of absen-
tee ballots in primary elections was such an exception to the general 
rule. The court's logic, however, is difficult to accept. Although recog-
nizing that, as a general proposition, the Supreme Court has afforded 
the same constitutional protections to the right to vote in primaries as 
are afforded to the right to vote in general elections, 46 the court, 
citing McDonald, concluded that, because primaries are "remedial" 
in nature, they should be treated differently in regard to the ques-
tion of a voter's right to receive an absentee ballot.46 
However, the remedial language in McDonald did not go to 
whether the rational basis standard should be used in evaluating 
plaintiff's equal protection argument, but was rather one factor in 
the Court's application of the rational basis test, which had already 
been accepted as appropriate for other reasons. Prominent among 
these reasons was the failure of the plaintiffs to claim a total denial 
of the right to vote, a failure that was not repeated in Fidell. The 
McDonald Court said: 
[The strict standard] is not necessary here, however, for two readily 
apparent reasons. First, the distinctions made by Illinois' absentee 
provisions are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race. Secondly, 
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory 
scheme has an impact on appellants' ability to exercise the funda-
mental right to vote .... We are then left with the more traditional 
standards for evaluating appellants' equal protection claims . • . . 
The distinctions drawn by the challenged statute . . . will be set 
aside as violative of the Equal Protection Clause only if based on 
reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of [a legitimate state end] .... 
With this much discretion, a legislature traditionally has been al-
lowed to take reform "one step at a time, addressing itself to the 
phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind" 
•••• 47 
43. The classification involved in absentee-ballot legislation could be one of several 
types. For example, in McDonald, the plaintiffs objected to a state statute that allowed 
absentee ballots to certain people who were unable to get to the polls but not to others, 
It is unclear whether the assailed classification in Fidell was (a) the distinction between 
those voters who cannot vote in person in general elections, who are given absentee 
ballots, and those who cannot vote in person in primary elections, who have no alter-
native means of exercising the franchise, or (b) the distinction between those able to go 
to the polls in person to vote in primary elections and those unable to do so. 
44. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). 
45. 343 F. Supp. at 916, citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States 
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
46. 343 F. Supp. at 916. 
47. 394 U.S. at 807-09, quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 
483, 489 (1955). 
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This language can be contrasted with previous voting' cases in which 
the strict standard was applied; in those cases the Court had not 
tolerated delay in granting the right to vote. 48 
McDonald, and perhaps Fidell, appear to be the only instances 
in which it could be argued that the Supreme Court has refused to 
apply a strict standard of review to classifications by means of which 
a state has effectively denied the vote to some of its citizens. The 
present Court evidently feels that the proper standard of review is 
still an open question, at least where the plaintiffs have alleged that 
all alternatives have been foreclosed. In Goosby v. Osser,49 the plain-
tiffs objected to a statutory scheme that required that polling places 
be open to the public-thus eliminating the possibility of facilities 
in jails and asylums-and that also prohibited those confined in penal 
institutions from voting by absentee ballot.50 A federal district judge 
held that the plaintiff's claim that the scheme was unconstitutional 
presented no case or controversy51 and dismissed the complaint. The 
court of appeals affirmed, apparently on the ground that the claims 
were wholly insubstantial under McDonald, which was found to be 
dispositive as to the standard used to review statutes that set forth 
the mechanics of controlling the exercise of the franchise (e.g., estab-
lishing polling places, requirements for obtaining absentee ballots), 
as opposed to statutes controlling its selective distribution (e.g., resi-
dency requirements for registering to vote).52 The Supreme Court 
disagreed and pointed out that the plaintiffs in Goosby, unlike those 
in McDonald, alleged that they were absolutely prohibited from 
voting.ri3 The Court went,on to state: "We neither decide nor inti-
mate any view upon the merits. It suffices that we hold that _Mc-
Donald does not 'foreclose the subject' of petitioners' challenge to the 
Pennsylvania statutory scheme."54 The Court then remanded the 
48. E.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
49. 409 U.S. 512 (1973). 
50. 409 U.S. at 513-14. See Devlin v. Osser, 434 Pa. 408, 254 .A.2d 303 (1969); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 25, §§ 623-17(e), -20 (1963), 2602(w)(l2) (Supp. 1973). 
51. He reached this conclusion because the principal defendants admi~ted tha~ the 
statutes were unconstitutional_409 U.S._at 514-15 __ & 515 n.3. 
52. 452 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir. 1971). 
53. 409 U.S. at 521-22. 
54. 409 U.S. at 522. Justice Marshall, sitting as a Circuit Justice, had occasio1,1 to 
address the issue in O'Brien v. Skinner, 409 U.S. 1240 (1972). Seventy-two prisoners, 
who were in jail serving sentences for misdemeanors or awaiting- trial, challenged an 
absentee-voting statute that allowed ballots only to those whose confinement' in state 
institutions was due to physical disability. Although Justice Marshall ultimately de-
cided that the prisoners applied to him at too late a date, four days before the election, 
he did state in dictum: 
I am not persuaded, however, that McDonald governs this case. • .• In McDonald 
there was "nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme 
[had] an impact on appellants' ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote." 
••• Here, in contrast, 1t seems clear that the State has rejected alternative means 
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case to a three-judge district court for a hearing on the merits. There-
fore, it is still possible that the stricter standard will be used in evalu• 
ating state requirements that restrict access to absentee ballots. 
As indicated above, the Court has adopted the strict approach in 
other voting situations and has held that, because of the importance 
of voting rights, classifications "which might invade or restrain them 
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined."li6 The use of this 
standard in situations like Fidell could arguably be rejected on the 
ground that the individual voter, and not the state, is responsible 
for any possible disenfranchisement. It could be said that a voter 
who has chosen to be absent on election day, like a person who waits 
to vote after the polls have closed, has voluntarily foregone the right 
to vote. Some absences, however, are clearly not voluntary. For in• 
stance, one named plaintiff in Fidell was a member of the armed 
forces. The plaintiffs in 1vicDonald were detained by the state itself, 
although they had been neither tried nor convicted of any crimes. 
Other absences, while not caused by the state, are nevertheless far 
from dictated by individual choice. Physical disability, such as that 
suffered by one Fidell plaintiff, often prevents voters from reaching 
the polls. 
Even those actions that appear voluntary on the surface are often 
in fact beyond the control of the wandering voter. A student attend• 
ing a school away from his voting district may not be able to afford 
to attend school near home or to return on election day, 60 and some 
employees may in effect be forced to risk their jobs in order to stay 
in the area to vote. McDonald recognized that many such persons, 
including "those serving on juries within the county of their resi-
dence, mothers with children who cannot afford a baby sitter, persons 
attending ill relations within their own county, doctors who are often 
called on to do emergency work, and businessmen called away from 
their precincts on business," are ineligible to receive absentee ballots 
under Illinois law. 57 
Even if these. absences are considered to be voluntary, voluntari-
ness should not be a substantial factor in deciding upon a standard 
of review. In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. JJ,GB the 
by which applicants might exercise their right to vote, Deprivation of absentee 
ballots is therefore tantamount to deprivation of the franchise itself •••• 
409 U.S. at 1241. 
55. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
56. The problem of the student voter may be somewhat alleviated by judicial deci• 
sions allowing students to establish residences in their college towns, see, e.g., Wilkins 
v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971), but not all courts have recognized this 
possibility. See, e.g., Gorenberg v. Onondaga County Bd. of Elections, 38 App. Div. 2d 
145, 328 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1971). 
57. 394 U.S. at 810 n.8. 
58. 395 U.S. 621 (1969), See also Dunn v, Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), where the 
state residency requirement gave the voter a choice between either staying in his old 
state and voting or exercising his constitutional right to travel by moving to a new 
state and not voting. The Court held the requirement unconstitutional. 
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Court struck down a: state statute that required voters in school dis-
trict elections to be owners or lessors of real property in the district 
or parents or guardians of children enrolled in the local public 
schools. The plaintiff; a stockbroker, was a bachelor who lived with 
his parents. Although his ineligibility to vote was arguably the result 
of his choice not to rent or buy a dwelling place, the Court did not 
find that factor significant. 
In short, the proper test to be applied to any state classification 
that denies absentee ballots to some class of qualified state electors 
is the strict test, which requires that the state defend its classification 
by showing that it is precisely tailored and that it serves a compelling 
governmental interest. It is unlikely that a state will be able to meet 
this burden. For example, one of the state interests posited to justify 
restricting the availability of absentee ballots to certain defined 
classes of voters is the prevention of fraud.59 It is doubtful whether 
this justification would survive judicial ·scrutiny. I£ the state is to 
deny the absentee ballot to certain classes of voters on this basis, it 
must narrowly classify voters as to their proclivity to commit fraud. 
The classifications now made by most states have nothing to do with 
the prevention of fraud. 
If the state does not allow any voters to use absentee ballots, 
justifications for the consequent unequal treatment between those 
who can and those who cannot vote in person might again center on 
fraud. But there are other, less drastic means to the same end, for 
the elaborate mechanisms already established by the states to pro-
tect their electotal processes from fraud by those who vote in person60 
cah also be used to safeguard them against fraud on the part of ab-
sentee voters. For example, while a state does have a legitimate inter-
est in preventing an illegitimate invasion by nonresident voters,61 
absentee voters, by definition, must fulfill all voting qualifications, 
including residence, in order to obtain a ballot. The exclusion of 
59. See, e.g., Bullington v. Grabow, 88 Colo. 561, 298 P. 1059 (1931); Haggard v. 
Misko, 164 Neb. 778, 83 N.W.2d 483 (1957); Matter of Baker, 126 Misc. 49, 213 N.Y.S. 
524 (Sup, Ct. 1925). Courts often obfuscate discussions of the possibilities of fraud in 
the electoral process with discourses on democracy. In a case involving allegedly illegal 
absentee ballots, the Supreme Court of Florida expressed its concern about safeguarding 
election results: 
No democracy can long endure if the electorate is corrupted and enticed to 
depart from the constitutional pattern on election day ..•• [T]he most abject traitor 
to democratic institutions is the one who buys or intimidates the electorate for 
personal gain and next to him is the voter-who habitually goes into the OJ?en 
market and pawns his vote to anyone who will purchase it. They are the termites 
and screw-worms of democracy and if not exterminated, they will surely wreck the 
ship of state as the latter will destroy the house or the dumb creature on which 
they feed •..• If democracy is as precious as we profess it to be, why not pursue its 
enemies as relentlessly as we do the boll weevil, the tobacco bug, the Mediterranean 
fruit fly or the bean beetle? 
State ex rel. Whitley v. Rinehart, 140 Fla. 645, 651-52, 192 S. 819, 822 (1939). 
60. See, e.g., N.Y. ELECTIONS LAW §§ 190-226 (McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKin-
ney Supp. 1972) (detailed procedures for conduct of elections). 
(jJ. Dµnn v. ~lu~tein1 4()5 v.s. 31J0, 345 (1972). 
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would-be absentee voters does nothing to further the state's valid 
goal of ensuring bona fide residence. Another valid fear is the use 
of fictitious voter names. Again, the state also faces this problem 
with regard to those who vote in person. A comparison of signatures 
on ballot applications with registration lists is a sufficient safeguard 
in both cases. Double voting can be prevented by the reasonable 
precaution of cross-checking lists of those who vote in person with 
lists of absentee voters. 
The Supreme Court's disposition of Dunn v. Blumstein62 is evi-
dence that state schemes premised on the prevention of fraud that 
do not always achieve their goals in the least restrictive manner may 
not survive strict scrutiny by the courts. The Court in Dunn deter-
mined that, while durational residence laws may have once been 
necessary to deter voting by nonresidents, that objective is now ade-
quately fulfilled by the voter registration cutoff date, which gives a 
state a reasonable length of time before an election to verify a voter's 
residence. In the absence of proof that a longer period than that pro-
vided by the registration cutoff is necessary, any further residence 
requirement constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of the 
vote.63 
The reasoning in Dunn can be applied to absentee-voting stat-
utes. In an age of increasing computerization and sophisticated re-
cording techniques, mere allegations of potential fraud should not 
be sufficient to restrict the availability of absentee ballots. The con-
gressional determination that seven days is enough time to detect 
fraud in the use of absentee ballots in presidential and vice-presi-
dential elections64 is one answer to state claims that further limita-
tions are necessary. 
Additional costs and administrative burdens are the only other 
justifications that have been advanced for a state's denial of absentee 
ballots. In Fidell, New York claimed that last-minute changes in the 
ballot plus the necessity of a different ballot for each election district 
made it impractical to provide absentee ballots in primaries.00 The 
credibility of this argument is greater in Fidell than in McDonald, 
where the step of providing absentee ballots to certain groups voting 
in the election in question had already been taken. It may be that 
the additional cost of enlarging the number of eligible classes would 
62. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
63. 405 U.S. at 336. The Court also noted that the Voting Rights Act Amendments 
of 1970, discussed in note 4 supra, abolished residence requirements for presidential 
and vice-presidential elections and established the permissible registration cutoff at 
thirty days before the election. It stated that "[t]here is no reason to think that what 
Congress thought was unnecessary to prevent fraud in presidential elections should not 
also be unnecessary in other elections." 405 U.S. at 349 n.19. 
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-I(d) (1970). 
65. See text accompanying note 36 supra. 
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be minimal, since the machinery for processing absentee ballots al-
ready exists. But even in cases where the government has not set up 
machinery for absentee ballots, it remains the government's re-
sponsibility to run elections and bear the costs incurred. 66 The basic 
mechanism for processing votes exists; the state must only supply 
and count the extra ballots. Moreover, fears of increases in adminis-
trative costs cannot be ordained as constitutional justifications to 
deny the vote. 67 
Thus, if the compelling interest standard is adopted, as it should 
be, it is likely that state limitations on access to absentee ballots 
when no alternative means of voting are available will be found to 
be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. If a rational basis 
test is applied, however, it is likely that the present state statutory 
schemes will be upheld. 
66. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 148-49 (1972), where Chief Justice Burger 
stated: "Viewing the myriad governmental functions supported from general revenues, 
it is difficult to single out any of a higher order than the conduct of elections at all 
levels to bring forth those persons desired by their fellow citizens to govern." 
67. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 148-49 (1972). 
